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Abstract—Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has been
developed as a key multi-access technique for 5G. However,
secure transmission remains a challenge in NOMA. Especially,
the user with weakest channel is most threatened by eaves-
dropping, due to its highest transmit power. Two schemes are
proposed to generate artificial jamming at the NOMA base
station (BS), aiming at disrupting the potential eavesdropping
without affecting the legitimate transmission. In the first scheme,
the transmit power of artificial jamming is maximized, with
its received power at each receiver higher than that of other
users. Thus, the jamming signal can be eliminated via successive
interference cancellation (SIC) before others. When the transmit
power of the BS is inadequate, the transmit jamming power is
maximized with the jamming signal zero-forced at each receiver.
Thus, the legitimate transmission is not affected by the jamming,
and the eavesdropping can be disrupted effectively. Due to
the non-convexity of these two optimization problems, we first
convert them to convex ones and then provide an iterative
algorithm to solve them. Simulation results are presented to show
the effectiveness of the proposed schemes in guaranteeing the
security of NOMA networks.
Index Terms—Artificial jamming, beamforming optimization,
non-orthogonal multiple access, physical layer security, zero-
forcing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has become an
important multi-access technique for 5G networks due to its
high efficiency and low latency [1]. Different from orthogonal
multiple access [2], NOMA can accommodate multiple users
that share a single orthogonal resource block to satisfy the
requirement of massive connections [3]. There exist many
kinds of NOMA techniques, and we mainly focus on the
power-domain NOMA in this paper. It utilizes power allo-
cation to control the transmit power of each user based on the
difference in channel strengths. Then, successive interference
cancellation (SIC) can be exploited to decode the signals from
stronger channels at each receiver to recover the desired signal.
Due to its excellent performance, NOMA has attracted great
interest from both academia and industry [4]–[14]. In [4], a
cooperative NOMA scheme was proposed for 5G networks by
Ding et al., and its outage probability and diversity order were
derived. A novel design of precoding and decoding matrices
for multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) NOMA systems
was proposed in [5], with power allocation and user pairing.
In [6], Sun et al. utilized power allocation to maximize the
ergodic capacity of Rayleigh fading MIMO-NOMA systems.
The downlink sum rate of a multiple-input single-output
(MISO) NOMA network was maximized by Hanif et al. in [7]
via joint precoding optimization. In [8], H. Lin et al. presented
a novel view of multi-user hybrid massive MIMO systems,
which can be deemed as a type of non-orthogonal angle divi-
sion multiple access. Some technical issues on NOMA-based
cognitive radio networks were discussed in [9]. In [10], Chen
et al. exploited a secondary NOMA relay to achieve spectrum
sharing via connecting the long-distance primary transceivers.
Power allocation and user scheduling were optimized by Wu
et al. for NOMA relay-assisted networks in [11]. In [12],
Xiao et al. proposed a power allocation scheme based on
reinforcement learning to prevent the NOMA system from
adversarial jamming attacks. The performance of a downlink
NOMA relay system was studied by Wan et al. in [13] over
Nakagami-m fading with partial channel state information
(CSI). In [14], Chen et al. established a novel multi-antenna
NOMA framework including user clustering, CSI acquisition,
beamforming and SIC, and the transmission rate performance
was analyzed.
However, secure transmission still remains a key challenge
for NOMA systems, due to the ostensible openness and vulner-
ability of wireless channels. In particular, in NOMA networks,
the transmit power of the user with the weakest channel should
2be the highest to perform SIC when the quality of service
(QoS) requirements of users are the same, leading to easy
interception by potential eavesdroppers. To this end, physical
layer security has become an effective method to prevent
eavesdropping using physical techniques. Following Wyner’s
pioneering work in [15], much research has been conducted
to improve the performance of secure transmission through
the methods of physical layer security, such as beamforming
optimization [16], [17], cooperative relaying [18], [19], artifi-
cial jamming [20], [21], and interference management [22]–
[24], etc. Recently, there has also been some emerging research
on the physical layer security of NOMA networks [25]–[31].
In [25], Zhang et al. maximized the secrecy sum rate in
single-input single-output (SISO) NOMA networks through
power allocation. A transmit antenna selection based secure
NOMA scheme was proposed by Lei et al. [26], in which an
expression of secrecy outage probability with antenna selection
was derived. In [27], He et al. proposed a novel design of
secure NOMA systems, in which the optimal decoding order,
transmission rate and power allocation were considered. The
physical layer security for cooperative NOMA systems was
studied by Chen et al. [28], in which an expression of secrecy
outage probability was derived. In [29], Li et al. maximized
the sum secrecy rate of central users via secure beamforming
in downlink NOMA networks, in which users were grouped
as multiple clusters. The physical layer security of NOMA in
large-scale networks was investigated via stochastic geometry
by Liu et al. [30], in both single-antenna and multi-antenna
scenarios. In [31], beamforming and power allocation were
exploited by Ding et al. to enhance the spectrum efficiency
and security of NOMA assisted multicast-unicast streaming.
Furthermore, artificial jamming can be exploited to guarantee
the secure transmission in MISO-NOMA networks [32], [33].
In [32], artificial jamming was generated by using a portion
of the antennas at the NOMA base station (BS) to constrain
jamming into the null space of legitimate channels in a two-
user NOMA network; while in [33], simultaneous wireless
information and power transfer was considered in a cognitive
MISO-NOMA network.
Based on the above observations, artificial jamming is
generated together with the legitimate information using all the
antennas at the NOMA BS in this paper, and the eavesdropping
can be effectively disrupted by maximizing the transmit power
of jamming without affecting the legitimate transmission. The
motivations and contributions are summarized as follows.
 To the best of our knowledge, only a few works have fo-
cused on the artificial jamming based secure transmission
for MISO-NOMA networks [32], [33]. Different from
these works, we propose to combine artificial jamming
with SIC, which means that the jamming signal can be
completely eliminated at the legitimate receivers based
on SIC, without affecting the legitimate transmission.
 In the first scheme, the transmit power of jamming is
maximized to disrupt eavesdropping, with the modified
SIC decoding order, the required signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) of each legitimate user, and the
transmit power constraint of BS satisfied. In this scheme,
Fig. 1. Demonstration of the artificial jamming assisted MISO-NOMA
network with K legitimate users and one potential eavesdropper.
the jamming signal can be eliminated via SIC before other
users, as it has the highest received power.
 The optimization problem in the first scheme is non-
convex. Thus, it is first converted to a convex problem
by using the first-order Taylor approximation, which can
be solved iteratively based on the conventional concave-
convex procedure accordingly.
 A second scheme is proposed when the transmit power of
BS is inadequate. In the scheme, the transmit jamming
power is maximized to disrupt the eavesdropping, and
the jamming signal is zero-forced at all the legitimate
receivers, with the required SINR of each user and
the transmit power constraint of the BS satisfied. The
optimization problem is also non-convex and can be
solved similarly to the first scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the system model is presented. In Section III, the optimiza-
tion problem of the first scheme is formulated, and a low-
complexity algorithm is proposed. The second zero-forcing
scheme is proposed in Section IV. In Section V, simulation
results are presented, followed by conclusions in Section VI.
Notation: CMN is the space of complex matrices. IN is
the NN identity matrix. CN (n;N) is the complex Gaussian
distribution with mean matrix n and covariance matrix N. A 
0 means that A is a Hermitian positive semidefinite matrix.
Re() is defined as the real operator. 5 denotes the gradient.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
AMISO-NOMA wireless network is considered as shown in
Fig. 1, in which a BS with M antennas sends the confidential
information to K single-antenna users. We also assume that
there exists a potential eavesdropper that intends to intercept
the confidential information for the legitimate users, and its
CSI is not available at the legitimate network. To disrupt
the eavesdropping and guarantee the secure transmission of
legitimate users, artificial jamming is generated together with
the NOMA information at the BS, without affecting the
legitimate transmission.
3The transmit signal at the BS can be expressed as
x =
XK
k=1
vksk + vjamz (1)
where vk 2 CM1 denotes the beamforming vector for the
kth user with kvkk2 = Pk; k 2 K , f1; 2; : : : ;Kg, sk
is the transmitted signal of the kth user with unit power
jskj2 = 1, vjam 2 CM1 is the beamforming vector for
the artificial jamming with kvjamk2 = Pjam, and z is the
artificial jamming with unit power jzj2 = 1, which is a zero-
mean complex Gaussian random viable. We can conclude
that the beamforming vector vjam is specifically designed to
avoid affecting the legitimate transmission, while the artificial
jamming signal z is randomly generated to disrupt the eaves-
dropping effectively.
The received signal at the kth user can be given by
yk = hkx+nk = hk
XK
j=1
vjsj+hkvjamz+nk; k 2 K (2)
where nk  CN (0; 2) denotes the additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) at the kth user, with zero mean and variance
2. The channel coefficient vector from the BS to the kth user
can be expressed as
hk =
q
d k gk 2 C1M (3)
where the distance between them is dk,  is defined as the
channel power gain at the reference distance of 1 m, and   2
denotes the path-loss exponent. In addition, gk  CN (0; I)
denotes the small-scale Rayleigh fading gain. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the channel gains between the BS
and legitimate users satisfy
0 < kh1k2      khKk2 : (4)
In NOMA systems, SIC should be utilized to remove the
multi-access interference (MAI) at the receivers. Accordingly,
a user with a stronger channel should first decode the messages
from other users with weaker channels, and then remove
the MAI from its received signal before decoding its own
message. Therefore, the decoding order of SIC in MISO-
NOMA networks can be represented as8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
max
m=2;:::;K
jh1vmj2  jh1v1j2
: : : : : :
max
m=k+1;:::;K
jhkvmj2  jhkvkj2      jhkv1j2
: : : : : :
jhKvK j2      jhKv1j2:
(5)
According to (5), SIC is adopted at each receiver to decode
its own information, which can be performed based on the
differences of channel gain among users. For example, at the
kth receiver, 2  k  K   1, the receiver has to decode the
messages of the 1st user to the (k 1)th user before recovering
its own. Thus, the achievable SINR of the jth user (1  j 
k   1) at the kth receiver can be expressed as
SINRjk =
jhkvj j2XK
m=j+1
jhkvmj2 + jhkvjamj2 + 2
;
2  k  K   1; 1  j  k   1:
(6)
Based on (6), the kth receiver can successfully decode the
message of the jth user only when SINRjk  rjth, where rjth is
the received SINR threshold for the signal of the jth user. After
subtracting all the MAIs successfully from the superimposed
signal at the kth receiver, the desired message for the kth user
can be retrieved by taking the interferences from the (k+1)th
user to the Kth user as noise due to their lower powers. In
this way, the received SINR of the desired signal at the kth
receiver can be expressed as
SINRkk=
jhkvkj2
KX
m=k+1
jhkvmj2+jhkvjamj2+2
; 2  k  K 1: (7)
For the Kth user, all the interference should be subtracted
from its received signal, and the received SINR of its desired
signal can be written as
SINRKK =
jhKvK j2
jhKvjamj2 + 2
: (8)
For the 1st user, the interference from the other K   1 users
should all be taken as noise, and the received SINR of its
desired signal can be denoted as
SINR11 =
jh1v1j2XK
m=2
jh1vmj2 + jh1vjamj2 + 2
: (9)
From (7) to (9), we can observe that, although the potential
eavesdropping can be effectively disrupted by the artificial
jamming, the legitimate transmission in the network will also
be degraded. Thus, two joint beamforming and jamming op-
timization schemes are proposed to disrupt the eavesdropping
without affecting the legitimate transmission of the NOMA
network in the following sections.
III. JOINT BEAMFORMING AND JAMMING OPTIMIZATION
To guarantee the security of the MISO-NOMA network
with legitimate transmission is not affected, in this section,
we propose a joint beamforming and jamming optimization
scheme, in which the jamming power is maximized to disrupt
the eavesdropping with the QoS of legitimate users satisfied.
In addition, an iterative algorithm is proposed to solve this
non-convex optimization problem with low computational
complexity.
A. Minimizing Transmit Power Without Jamming
According to the conventional decoding order of the SIC
in (5), the sum transmit power at the BS for the users can be
minimized with the QoS of each legitimate user satisfied, as
4follows1.
min
v1;v2;:::;vK
XK
i=1
kvik2
s:t: SINRkk  rk; k 2 K;8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
max
m=2;:::;K
jh1vmj2  jh1v1j2
: : : : : :
max
m=k+1;:::;K
jhkvmj2jhkvkj2: : :jhkv1j2
: : : : : :
jhKvK j2      jhKv1j2:XK
i=1
kvik2 < PBS
(10)
where rk is the SINR requirement of the kth user and PBS
denotes the constraint of the total transmit power at the BS.
However, secure transmission in the network when (10) is
adopted cannot be guaranteed. In addition, when PBS is much
higher than the value needed to satisfy the QoS of all users, the
available power at BS is not fully utilized. Thus, the residual
power of PBS can be further exploited as artificial jamming to
enhance the performance of secure transmission, as discussed
in the following sections.
B. Modified SIC Decoding Order
We first consider the case when adequate transmit power can
be allocated for jamming at the BS, and thus, we can enhance
the received power of jamming at each user to first decode
the jamming signal by SIC. In doing this, the transmit power
of jamming can be increased significantly, through which the
eavesdropping will be disrupted. Thus, the decoding order
defined in (5) for the conventional MISO-NOMA scheme can
be modified as8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
max
m=2;:::;K
jh1vmj2  jh1v1j2  jh1vjamj2
: : : : : :
max
m=k+1;:::;K
jhkvmj2jhkvkj2 : : :jhkv1j2jhkvjamj2
: : : : : :
jhKvK j2      jhKv1j2  jhKvjamj2:
(11)
Accordingly, the jamming will be completely cancelled in the
first step of SIC, which will not affect the following decoding
procedure at each user. Therefore, the expressions for the
received SINR of the desired signal for the kth user in (7)
to (9) can be updated as
SINRkk =
jhkvkj2XK
m=k+1
jhkvmj2 + 2
; 1  k  K   1; (12)
SINRKK = jhKvK j2 =2: (13)
Thus, we can conclude that SIC can be performed in the
same way as in conventional NOMA as long as the transmit
jamming power is high enough.
1The optimization problem (10) is utilized to bring forward Scheme I and
serve as a benchmark in the simulations.
C. Scheme I
Based on the modified SIC decoding order in (11), the
beamforming and jamming can be jointly optimized to max-
imize the transmit power of jamming, with the QoS of each
legitimate user and the transmit power constraint satisfied,
which can be formulated as
max
v1;v2;:::;vK ;
vjam
kvjamk2 = Pjam (14a)
s:t: SINRkk  rk; k 2 K; (14b)8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
max
m=2;:::;K
jh1vmj2  jh1v1j2  jh1vjamj2
: : : : : :
max
m=k+1;:::;K
jhkvmj2jhkvkj2: : :jhkv1j2jhkvjamj2
: : : : : :
jhKvK j2      jhKv1j2  jhKvjamj2;
(14c)
XK
i=1
kvik2 + kvjamk2 = PBS : (14d)
where PBS is the constraint of the total transmit power at the
BS, including the power for both the legitimate users and the
jamming. In (14), the transmit power of the artificial jamming
is maximized, instead of optimizing it, due to the fact that the
eavesdropping CSI is not available in the legitimate network.
In addition, considering the potential eavesdropper, the
received SINR of the kth legitimate user at the eavesdropper
can be expressed as
SINRke =
jhevkj2XK
m=1;m6=k jhevmj
2
+ jhevjamj2 + 2
: (15)
Thus, the secrecy rate of the kth user can be expressed as (16)
at the top of next page, k = 1; 2; : : : ;K 1. For the Kth user,
the secrecy rate can be obtained by replacing SINRkk using
(13). In (15) and (16), he is the channel coefficient vector
from the BS to the eavesdropper2. Let [x]+ , max(x; 0).
Remark: From (16), we can conclude that high-power
jamming will disrupt the eavesdropping effectively, without
affecting the decoding at legitimate receivers. In addition, we
can also observe that the interference among users can also
disrupt the eavesdropping. Particularly, the users with stronger
channels from the BS will achieve better security performance
when the QoS requirements of users are the same, due to the
fact that the desired signal from stronger users tends to be
hidden in the mixed signal transmitted by the BS. For the
users with weaker channels, the jamming is important and
it is necessary to guarantee the security, due to their higher
transmit power.
D. Approximate Transformations
The proposed optimization problem in (14) is non-convex,
which is difficult to solve. Thus, a suboptimal algorithm with
2In this paper, we do not need the eavesdropping CSI for the legitimate
network. Nevertheless, the eavesdropping CSI is used to analyze the secure
performance of the proposed schemes in (15) and (16), i.e., it is only used
for the performance analysis, not for the design in the proposed schemes.
5Rsk =
h
log2

1 + SINRkk

  log2

1 + SINRke
i+
=
264log2
0B@1 + jhkvkj2XK
m=k+1
jhkvmj2 + 2
1CA  log2
0B@1 + jhevkj2XK
m=1;m 6=k jhevmj
2
+ jhevjamj2 + 2
1CA
375
+
: (16)
low computational complexity is developed for a solution in
this subsection. To achieve this, some necessary approxima-
tions are made first. According to (12) and (13), the problem
(14) can be rewritten as
max
v1;v2;:::;vK ;
vjam
kvjamk2 (17a)
s:t:
8>>>><>>>>:
jhkvkj2XK
m=k+1
jhkvmj2 + 2
 rk; k 6= K
jhKvK j2
2
 rK ;
(17b)
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
max
m=2;:::;K
jh1vmj2  jh1v1j2  jh1vjamj2
: : : : : :
max
m=k+1;:::;K
jhkvmj2jhkvkj2: : :jhkv1j2jhkvjamj2
: : : : : :
jhKvK j2      jhKv1j2  jhKvjamj2;
(17c)
XK
i=1
kvik2 + kvjamk2 = PBS : (17d)
This gives
max
v1;v2;:::;vK ;
vjam
kvjamk2 (18a)
s:t:
8>><>>:
XK
m=k+1
jhkvmj2  jhkvkj
2
rk
  2; k 6= K
0  jhKvK j
2
rK
  2;
(18b)
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
max
m=2;:::;K
jh1vmj2  jh1v1j2  jh1vjamj2
: : : : : :
max
m=k+1;:::;K
jhkvmj2jhkvkj2: : :jhkv1j2jhkvjamj2
: : : : : :
jhKvK j2      jhKv1j2  jhKvjamj2;
(18c)
XK
i=1
kvik2 + kvjamk2 = PBS : (18d)
The problem in (18) is still non-convex. Then, Property 1 is
introduced as follows, which shows an efficient way to convert
the problem (18) into a convex problem.
Property 1: In the problem of finding the extreme value
of a function, a differentiable function can be replaced by
its corresponding tangent function value at the tangent point.
Simply, we define the tangential function as g
 
x; x(m)

and
the point of tangency as x(m). Then, for a differentiable convex
function f(x), the expression is f(x)  g  x; x(m), where the
equality holds when x = x(m). Furthermore, g
 
x; x(m)

can
be derived as the first order Taylor expansion around x(m).
Thus, the inequality can be expressed as
f(x)g

x; x(m)

=f(x(m))+5f

x(m)
y 
x x(m)

: (19)
Similarly, when x = x(m), the equality holds.
Based on Property 1, the constraints in (18b) can be
transformed into convex ones, using the following proposition.
Proposition 1: From the above analysis and based on (18b),
we define a function as
F (vk) = jhkvkj2 =rk   2; k 2 K: (20)
The first order Taylor approximation to F (vk) at a tangent
point vk can be expressed as
F (vk; vk)=
2Re

hkvkvykh
y
k

 Re

hkvkvykh
y
k

rk
  2: (21)
In this way, (20) can be replaced by (21), and the constraint
(18b) can be approximated as a convex one.
Proof: According to Property 1, (20) is a differentiable
convex function, which satisfies
F (vk)  F (vk) +5F (vk)y(vk   vk): (22)
Substituting (20) into this inequality (22) based on the law of
derivation, the expression can be calculated as
F (vk)  hk
vkvykh
y
k
rk
  2 + 2hkv
y
kh
y
k
rk
(vk   vk): (23)
When vkvyk  0 and hkhyk  0, we have
F (vk) , F (vk; vk) : (24)
Thus, we can substitute the right side of (18b) with (21),
and the previous norm-squared function can be approximated
as linear functions. Accordingly, the constraint (18b) can
be transformed into a convex one. This approximation is
reasonable when vk = vk is satisfied.
Similarly, we can also make the first order Taylor expansion
for the objective function (18a) according to Property 1. First,
define an auxiliary variable t  0. Then, according to Property
1, we can transform the norm-squared objective function into
a linear one as
kvjamk2  2Re

vyjamvjam

 Re

vyjamvjam

 t: (25)
Finally, both of constraint (18b) and the objective function
(18a) can be converted into convex functions.
Nevertheless, the problem is still non-convex because of
(18c), which can be regarded as a series of inequalities like
jhkvmj2  jhkvij2 : (26)
6max
v1;v2;:::;vK ;
vjam
t (33a)
s:t: t  0; (33b)
t  2Re

vyjamvjam

 Re

vyjamvjam

; (33c)( [2hkvk+1; : : : ; 2hkvK ; (Fk   1)]y  Fk + 1; k = 1; 2; : : : ;K   1
0  FK ; k = K;
(33d)
jhkvmj2  Hki (vi; vi) ; (33e)
jhkv1j2  2Re

hkvjamvyjamh
y
k

 Re

hkvjamvyjamh
y
k

; (33f)hvy1; vy2; : : : ; vyK ; vyjamiy =pPBS : (33g)
It is worth noting that the right sides of these inequalities are
quadratic functions for variable vi, which can be linearized by
the same method used above. Define
Hki(vi) = jhkvij2 : (27)
and its corresponding first order Taylor approximation can be
calculated as
Hki (vi; vi) = 2Re

hkvivyih
y
k

 Re

hkvivyih
y
k

: (28)
Based on the above approximations, all the inequalities in
(18c) in the same form as (26) can be converted into convex
functions. Then, the constraint (18c) can be replaced by
jhkvmj2  Hki (vi; vi) ; (29)
jhkv1j22Re

hkvjamvyjamh
y
k

 Re

hkvjamvyjamh
y
k

:(30)
In addition, the hyperbolic constraint
w2  xy; x  0; y  0 (31)
can be converted into
k[2w; x  y]yk  x+ y: (32)
Thus, the problem (18) can be transformed into a convex one
as given in (33).
E. Iterative Algorithm
Eq. (33) can be effectively solved using existing toolboxes,
such as CVX. Nevertheless, the solution of (33) is not com-
pletely equivalent to that of (18) owing to the approximations
and transformations, and thus, Algorithm 1 is proposed to
solve (18) based on the concave-convex procedure as follows.
The initial values can be generated randomly with the
constraints in (33) considered, which can be obtained easily
in practice [7].
In Proposition 2, it will be shown that the solution of
Algorithm 1 is viable to the problem (18).
Proposition 2: The solution to (33) in each iteration of
Algorithm 1 is a suboptimal solution to the problem (18).
Algorithm 1 Iterative Algorithm for Problem (18)
1: Initialization: Randomly set the initial values of vk and
vjam in (33) and set n = 1.
2: Repeat
3: Solve (33) using CVX, and get the optimal values vk and
vjam.
4: Substitute the temporary optimal values for the previous
set of values, i.e., vk = vk and vjam = vjam.
5: n = n+ 1.
6: Until Convergence or the maximum number of iterations
is satisfied.
7: Output: vk and vjam, 8k 2 K.
Proof: According to the principle of concave-convex
procedure, the relationship between the two previously defined
functions F (vk) and F (vk; vk) can be expressed as
F (vk)  F (vk; vk) ; (34)
F (vk) jvk=vk = F (vk; vk) jvk=vk : (35)
In addition, we define
G (vm) =
XK
m=k+1
jhkvmj2 : (36)
According to the constraint (18b), (36) can be expressed as
G (vm)  F (vk)  0: (37)
Thus, we can conclude
G (vm)  F (vk)  G (vm) F (vk; vk)  0: (38)
Then, in the nth iteration, the inequality (38) can be denoted
as
G

v(n)m

 F

v(n)k

 G

v(n)m

 F

v(n)k ; v
(n 1)
k

0 (39)
where the equality can be satisfied with v(n)k = v
(n 1)
k . We
focus on the transformation of the constraint (18b) above, and
all the other constraints in (18) can be proved similarly.
From the above derivations, we can conclude that the
solution to (33) is a feasible subset of that to (18).
7The proposed Algorithm 1 converges, according to the re-
sults in [34]. Especially, in each iteration, the jamming transmit
power kvjamk2 becomes higher than or equal to the value
in the previous iteration. On the other hand, due to the rate
requirement of legitimate users and transmit power constraint
of the BS, the maximum value of kvjamk2 is limited. Thus,
the convergence of Algorithm 1 can be guaranteed.
IV. ZERO-FORCING SCHEME FOR JAMMING
In Section III, the jamming transmit power can be maxi-
mized to disrupt the potential eavesdropping, with the perfor-
mance of legitimate users guaranteed. However, in (14), the
total transmit power at the BS, PBS , is also constrained. When
PBS is insufficient, the channels of legitimate users are under
severe fading, or the legitimate users require high transmission
rate, the constraint (14c) can be no longer satisfied. This is
because the received jamming power cannot always be higher
than the received signal power of all the other users at all
legitimate receivers.
For example, when (14) cannot be effectively solved due to
the transmit power constraint, assume that the order of received
power at each receiver can be achieved as8>>><>>>:
jh1vK j2    jh1vjamj2  jh1vlj2  : : : jh1v1j2
jh2vK j2    jh2vjamj2  jh2vlj2  : : : jh2v1j2
: : : : : :
jhKvK j2 : : :jhKvjamj2jhKvlj2 : : : jhKv1j2:
(40)
In this case, the legitimate transmission from the 1st user to the
lth user will also be affected by artificial jamming, although
the eavesdropping can be disrupted at the same time.
Thus, in this section, a zero-forcing scheme for jamming
is proposed there are enough antennas equipped at the BS,
in which the transmit jamming power is maximized, with its
interference zero-forced at each legitimate receiver.
A. Scheme II
When the transmit power at the BS cannot satisfy (14),
the artificial jamming can be zero-forced by the BS at each
legitimate receiver via beamforming as
h1vjam = h2vjam = ::: = hKvjam = 0: (41)
Particularly, the SIC decoding order in Section II can be
rewritten as8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
0= jh1vjamj2 max
m=2;:::;K
jh1vmj2jh1v1j2
: : : : : :
0=jhkvjamj2 max
m=k+1;:::;K
jhkvmj2jhkvkj2: : :jhkv1j2
: : : : : :
0=jhKvjamj2  jhKvK j2  : : :jhKv1j2:
(42)
Thus, according to (42), the received SINR at the kth receiver
can be also expressed as (12) and (13).
With the QoS requirements of all the legitimate users and
the decoding order satisfied, the optimization problem can be
formulated as
max
v1;v2;:::;vK ;
vjam
kvjamk2 (43a)
s:t: SINRkk  rk; k 2 K; (43b)8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 = jh1vjamj2  max
m=2;:::;K
jh1vmj2  jh1v1j2
: : : : : :
0=jhkvjamj2 max
m=k+1;:::;K
jhkvmj2jhkvkj2 : : :jhkv1j2
: : : : : :
0 = jhKvjamj2  jhKvK j2      jhKv1j2:
(43c)XK
i=1
kvik2 + kvjamk2 = PBS ; i 2 K: (43d)
Thus, the potential eavesdropping can also be effectively
disrupted by maximizing the transmit jamming power in (42),
without affecting the legitimate transmission via zero-forcing.
The optimization problem (43) is non-convex, and is d-
ifficult to solve. Using similar approximations to (33), the
problem (43) can be transformed into a convex one as (44)
at the top of next page. Accordingly, Algorithm 1 can also be
used to solve (43).
Nevertheless, sufficient antennas should be equipped at
the BS to perform zero-forcing; otherwise, the problem still
remains unsolvable. Lemma 1 is introduced to determine the
minimum number of antennas required to perform zero-forcing
at the BS as follows.
Lemma 1: Zero-forcing in (43c) can be achieved when
M  K + 1: (45)
Proof: A generic polynomial system can be solved if and
only if the number of variables is no less than the number
of equations. For the zero-forcing in (43c), the number of
equations can be denoted as
Ne = K: (46)
The number of effective variables in the zero-forcing of (43c)
can be expressed as
Nv = M   1: (47)
When the number of variables is no less than the number of
equations, we have
Ne  Nv ) K M   1)M  K + 1 (48)
which can guarantee the feasibility of zero-forcing.
On the other hand, when the number of antennas is not
sufficient and the transmit power at BS PBS is low, both
optimization problems of (14) and (43) cannot be solved. In
this case, we can relax the decoding order of (42) into8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
0< jh1vjamj2 max
m=2;:::;K
jh1vmj2jh1v1j2
: : : : : :
0<jhkvjamj2 max
m=k+1;:::;K
jhkvmj2jhkvkj2: : :jhkv1j2
: : : : : :
0<jhKvjamj2jhKvK j2  : : :jhKv1j2:
(49)
which will not be further discussed in this paper.
8max
v1;v2;:::;vK ;
vjam
t (44a)
s:t: t  0; (44b)
t  2Re

vyjamvjam

 Re

vyjamvjam

; (44c)( [2hkvk+1; : : : ; 2hkvK ; (Fk   1)]y  Fk + 1; k = 1; 2; : : : ;K   1
0  FK ; k = K;
(44d)
jhkvmj2  Hki (vi; vi) ; (44e)
(41) and
hvy1; vy2; : : : ; vyK ; vyjamiy =pPBS : (44f)
B. Comparison of the Two Schemes
The key features of the proposed two schemes are compared
as follows.
 Feasibility: Scheme I is most feasible when the transmit
power of the BS, PBS , is high enough, without consid-
ering the number of antennas at the BS. Scheme II is
feasible only when enough antennas are equipped at the
BS, i.e., M  K + 1, but the transmit power of the BS
can be lower.
 Performance: When the transmit power of the BS is
sufficient, the secrecy rate of Scheme I is higher than that
of Scheme II, as more transmit power can be allocated
to artificial jamming. However, when the transmit power
of the BS is low, only Scheme II is feasible.
 Complexity: Comparing the optimization problems of
(14) and (43), the computational complexity of these two
schemes is almost the same, with that of Scheme II a
little lower than that of the first one. For the detail of
complexity analysis, refer to Appendix A.
Thus, the proposed two schemes should be utilized ac-
cording to the practical requirements of the systems. When
the transmit power of the BS is sufficient, Scheme I can
achieve better performance. When the transmit power of the
BS becomes lower, Scheme II can be utilized instead of
Scheme I due to its better feasibility in this case.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Simulation results are provided to evaluate the performances
of the two proposed schemes. In the simulation, we set  =
10 4 and  = 2:5, and the received SINR threshold at all users
is assumed to be r. For simplicity, we denote the kth user as
Uk, k = 1; 2; : : : ;K, and the distance from the BS to the
users and eavesdropper can be denoted as D in meters, i.e.,
D = (DU1 ; DU2 ; : : : ; DUK 1 ; DUK ; De), where De denotes
the distance from the BS to the eavesdropper.
The optimal jamming power in Scheme I is compared for
different values of r and 2 in Fig. 2. We use values M = 3,
K = 3, PBS = 10 dBm and D = (200, 100, 50, 90). From the
results, we can see that the jamming power becomes higher
when r is smaller. This is because more power can be allocated
to the jamming when the QoS requirement of the users is
relaxed. In addition, the jamming power increases when 2
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the optimal jamming power in Scheme I with different
SINR threshold r and channel noise 2, for M = 3, K = 3, PBS = 10
dBm and D = (200, 100, 50, 90).
decreases, due to the fact that the QoS of users can be achieved
with less transmit power, and thus more power can be allocated
for jamming.
The average secrecy rate and eavesdropping rate of the
users in Scheme I are compared in Fig. 3 for different values
of r. M = 3, K = 3, 2 =  110 dBm, PBS = 10
dBm and D = (200, 100, 50, 90). From Fig. 3, we can
see that the eavesdropping can be disrupted by the artificial
jamming effectively in Scheme I, and the eavesdropping rate
is close to 0. In addition, the secrecy rate of the users can be
improved significantly when r is larger, due to the fact that
the improvement of transmission rate results in higher secrecy
rate with smaller eavesdropping rate.
In addition, taking (10) as a benchmark, the eavesdropping
rate and secrecy rate of the users in Scheme I and Scheme (10)
are compared in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, respectively, for different
values of PBS . M = 3, K = 3, 2 =  110 dBm, r = 12
bit/s/Hz and D = (200, 100, 50, 90). From Fig. 4, we can
see that the eavesdropping rate of the users in Scheme I is
reduced by artificial jamming compared to that of Scheme
(10). Especially, the eavesdropping rate is lower than 0.2
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bit/s/Hz in Scheme I, and decreases with higher PBS , which
means that more power can be allocated to the jamming. In
addition, we can also find that the eavesdropping rate of the
1st user is higher than that of the other two users, due to
its highest transmit power. From Fig. 5, we can see that the
secrecy rate of Scheme I is much higher than that of Scheme
(10), as the eavesdropping rate can be disrupted effectively
by artificial jamming. In addition, the secrecy rate increases
with PBS in Scheme I, which means that more power can be
allocated to jamming when PBS is higher.
In Fig. 6, the optimal jamming power in Scheme II is
compared for different values of r and PBS , with M = 4,
K = 3, 2 =  110 dBm and D = (200, 100, 50, 90). From
the result, we can see that the jamming power at the NOMA
BS increases with PBS in Scheme II, as more power can be
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allocated for jamming when the total transmit power of the BS
is higher. Thus, the security of the network can be enhanced
with higher PBS . In addition, the jamming power decreases
with the SINR threshold r, because more transmit power is
needed to satisfy the QoS needed by the users.
The secrecy rate and eavesdropping rate of U1 in Scheme II
are compared in Fig. 7 for different values of r and PBS . Only
U1 is considered, due to the fact that its security is threatened
most. We consider values M = 4, K = 3, 2 =  110
dBm and D = (200, 100, 50, 90). From the results, we can
observe that the eavesdropping rate can be reduced effectively
by artificial jamming in Scheme II, although the eavesdropping
rate increases a little with the SINR requirement r. Thus, the
secrecy rate of U1 increases with r, due to the enhancement
of transmission rate. In addition, higher PBS will reduce the
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eavesdropping rate, and thus improve the secrecy rate of U1.
The secrecy rate of U1 is compared for both Scheme I
and Scheme II in Fig. 8, for different values of r and PBS ,
for M = 4, K = 3, 2 =  110 dBm and D = (200,
100, 50, 90). From the result, we can see that the secrecy
rate in both Scheme I and Scheme II can be guaranteed by
artificial jamming, which disrupts the potential eavesdropping
effectively. In addition, the secrecy rate of U1 increases with
r, due to the fact that the transmission rate increases obviously
with r, although the eavesdropping rate may also increase a
little. Furthermore, the secrecy rate of Scheme I is a little
higher than that of Scheme II when PBS is relatively higher,
i.e., for PBS = 20 dBm and PBS = 10 dBm. However, when
PBS becomes lower, e.g., PBS = 6 dBm, the optimization
problem (14) in Scheme I can no longer be solved, i.e.,
Scheme I becomes infeasible. While for Scheme II, it is always
feasible even when the transmit power of the BS is lower, e.g.,
PBS = 6 dBm, as long as enough antennas are equipped at
the BS according to Lemma 1.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, through generating artificial jamming at the
BS, we have proposed two joint beamforming and jamming
optimization schemes for MISO-NOMA networks to guarantee
security with the existence of a potential eavesdropper. In the
first scheme, the transmit power of artificial jamming has been
maximized, with its received power at each receiver higher
than that of other users. Thus, the jamming signal can be
cancelled via SIC before others, and the eavesdropping can
be disrupted effectively without affecting the legitimate trans-
mission. When the transmit power of the BS is not sufficient,
a second scheme has been proposed, in which the transmit
jamming power is maximized with the jamming signal zero-
forced at each receiver. Due to the non-convexity of these
two optimization problems, they have been first transformed
into convex problems, and an iterative algorithm has been
proposed to solve them based on conventional concave-convex
procedure. Simulation results have shown the efficiency and
effectiveness of the proposed two schemes. In our future work,
dynamic decoding order of SIC will be further considered to
guarantee the security of NOMA.
APPENDIX A
COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
According to [35], we can know that the computational
complexity of the interior-point algorithm for second-order
cone programming (SOCP) is normally based on the number
of variables, constraints and its dimensions.
In Scheme I, the number of constraints in (33) can be
expressed as (K2 + K + 3). Thus, the number of iterations
exploited to reduce the duality gap to a threshold can be upper
bounded by O  pK2 +K + 3. The number of variables and
dimensions for all constraints in (33) can be calculated as
(K2+K+2(K+1)M+1) and (3:5K2+2:5K+(K+2)M+1),
respectively. Therefore, the computational complexity of Al-
gorithm 1 for Scheme I can be obtained as (50).
Similarly, the number of constraints of Scheme II in (44) is
(K2 +K + 3), and the items (K2 +K + 2(K + 1)M + 1)
and (3:5K2 + 0:5K + (K + 2)M + 1) are the number of
variables and dimensions, respectively. Thus, the complexity
of Algorithm 1 for Scheme II can be obtained as (51).
Comparing (50) with (51), we can conclude that the com-
plexity of Scheme II is a little lower than that of Scheme I,
which is consistent as the analysis in Section IV-B.
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